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Disbarment in the Federal Courts
Recent political scandals involving lawyers have stimulated interest
in professional discipline.' Although the bar and the judiciary long
have attempted to regulate the conduct of attorneys, 2 attorney disci-
pline remains an unsolved problem. Reform efforts have focused largely
on discipline in state rather than federal courts.- This Note examines
the nature of federal disbarment and the disciplinary rules currently in
force. 4 It argues that the federal courts" should take a more active
role in attorney discipline and that Congress should authorize the
Supreme Court to promulgate uniform rules of discipline.
I. The Derivative Nature of Federal Disbarment
For the most part, federal discipline currently follows state disci-
pline. A federal court normally disciplines an attorney after a dis-
ciplinary proceeding by the state court,6 usually imposing the same
1. See, e.g., Aronson, Professional Responsibility: Education and Enforcement, 51
WASH. L. REV. 273 (1976). On attorney disciplinary proceedings and sanctions stemming
from the Watergate scandals, see, e.g., Comment, 1972 Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules
of Disciplinary Enforcement: Relieving the Uncertainties of Marginal Attorney Crimes,
79 DICK. L. REV. 588-89 n.3 (1975); Note, In re Krogh and Attorney Discipline in Wash-
ington, 12 WILLAMErTE L.J. 374 (1976) (discussing Washington Supreme Court's disbar-
ment of Egil Krogh, Jr. for felony arising out of Watergate scandal); Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Grievances, Annual Report 1973-74, pt. II
(on file with Yale Law Journal).
2. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1974). For an historical dis-
cussion of the Code of Professional Responsibility and its predecessor, the Canons of
Professional Ethics, see Note, Disbarment: A Case for Reform, 17 N.Y.L.F. 792, 793-97
(1971).
3. See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROB-
LEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970) [hereinafter cited as
ABA REPORT] (discussing deficiencies in state disciplinary procedures). Pennsylvania, for
example, recently reformed its disciplinary process. PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AND DISCIPLINARY
BOARD RULES AND PROCEDURES (1974). For a state-by-state account of discipline reform,
see ABA Special Committee on National Coordination of Disciplinary Enforcement,
Recommendation and Report 3-20 (Aug. 1972) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
4. Federal and state courts have wide latitude in their choice of sanctions. The avail-
able sanctions include (in order of increasing severity) reprimand, censure, fine, suspen-
sion, and disbarment. This Note discusses disbarment, but its conclusions apply equally
to the use of lesser disciplinary sanctions.
5. This Note focuses primarily on disbarment in the United States district courts.
Most attorney contact with federal courts occurs at the district court level, with discipline
normally handled by that court. See, e.g., In re Carroll, 416 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970). However, the higher federal courts have promulgated
disciplinary rules. E.g., U.S. Sup. CT. R. 8 (covering attorney disbarment); FED. R. APP.
P. 46(b) (uniform rule covering suspension or disbarment).
6. In re Abrams, 385 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (D.N.J. 1974), rev'd, 521 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038 (1975) ("[D]isciplinary proceedings in our courts ofttimes
follow upon the coattails of extensive records and hearings in the state courts ....
[Ojur disciplinary proceedings are . . .derivative because based in part on a previously
compiled state record.")
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sanction as the state court.7 However, the district courts act somewhat
more independently when misconduct arises in the federal sphere s or
when the prior state proceeding was so deficient that notions of
equity or requirements of procedural due process preclude following
it.9 This deference to state proceedings reflects, in part, the derivative
nature of attorney admission to federal practice.' 0 It also stems from the
view that federal practice is limited in extent 1 and that principles of
comity override benefits which might flow were federal discipline not
simply a by-product of state discipline. From a historical perspective,
deference is understandable because federal courts once did not occupy
the prominent place they do today.' 2 Yet today abdication of responsi-
bility with respect to discipline is no longer justifiable.
The derivative nature of federal disbarment has impeded the
development of effective disciplinary rules by the federal district
courts. There are no uniform federal procedures for disbarment and
suspension of attorneys.13 Each district court is authorized to develop
7. In his concurrence in In re Abrams. 521 F.2d 1094, 1106 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1038 (1975), Judge Rosenn observed:
Sixty-nine district courts responded to a survey asking whether they ever had deviated
from disciplinary actions taken by the courts of their states. One district court . . .
responded that they had a rule permitting disparate discipline .... Only three other
district courts cited instances of deviating from the action of their state courts.
8. See In re Abrams, 385 F. Supp. 1210, 1212 (D.N.J. 1974), rev'd, 521 F.2d 1094 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038 (1975). See In re Claiborne, 119 F.2d 647, 650 (Ist Cir.
1941) (district judge on own motion properly directed investigation as result of events
during federal litigation).
9. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278
(1957); -Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917) (dictum). A finding that the state dis-
barment cannot be followed does not preclude a federal court from conducting its own
inquiry. E.g., In re Bennethum, 196 F. Supp. 541, 545 (D. Del. 1961), ordering trial de
novo in 205 F. Supp. 821 (D. Del. 1962) (state disbarment proceeding provided inadequate
notice; district court appointed committee to prefer charges in federal court and disbarred
attorney following trial de novo).
10. An attorney may be admitted to federal district court following his ad-
mission to the highest court of the state within which the federal court sits. See, e.g.,
W.D.N.Y. GEN. R. 2(a); E.D. PA. R. 9(a); V.D. TEX. R. 2(a). For criticism of this method
of admission, see Wilkey, A Bar Examination for Federal Courts, 61 A.B.A.J. 1091 (1975).
11. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 385 F. Supp. 1210, 1212 (D.N.J. 1974), rev'd, 521 F.2d
1094 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038 (1975):
If the ... discipline [of a state] be more severe than ours, it will likely control the
practical impact because the ability to practice before this court would have little
meaning without the ability to practice law in New Jersey. If this Court's discipline
be more severe, the practical impact will be lessened considerably by the lawyer's
ability to practice law in New Jersey although not in this court.
12. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 200 (1974)
(citing 110% increase over 1940 in cases filed in federal district courts and 233% in-
crease in cases pending); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 3-4, 15-54
(1973) (discussing "explosion" in federal court litigation). See generally, Hart, Tile Rela-
tions Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.%. L. REv. 489, 491-506 (1954) (discussion
of the interstitial nature of federal courts).
13. In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 1970) ("In the federal system there is no
established uniform procedure for suspension and disbarment proceedings in the district
courts; the matter is left to the individual judicial districts.")
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its own disciplinary mechanism under Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure14 and pursuant to its own inherent authority to
regulate the attorneys who appear before it.15
Despite this authority, most federal judicial districts handle disci-
pline on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, some federal districts have no formal
disciplinary rules at all.'0 The others have adopted varying types of
disciplinary rules. The most prevalent requires an attorney disbarred
in another court to "show cause" why he should not be disciplined by
the federal court17 Two other rules are fairly common: the first re-
quires a lawyer convicted of a felony to show cause why he should not
be disbarred;'5 the second merely states that an attorney may be
disbarred for "good cause.'19
Those district courts which have promulgated substantive criteria
for disbarment or suspension from practice have developed disparate
standards.2 The courts also have accorded varying procedural protec-
tions.21 Only a few districts require that other courts receive notifica-
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 provides:
Each district court ... may from time to time make and amend rules governing
its practice not inconsistent with these rules. . . In all cases not provided for by
rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent
with these rules.
For discussions of the scope of Rule 83, see Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 1251 (1967); Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the
Federal District Courts-A Survey, 1966 DuKE L.J. 1011. It is questionable whether Rule
83 go-erns promulgation of disciplinary rules by the district courts, as discipline may
he outside the scope of the "practice" of the district courts. See TAN 69 infra. Even so,
the district courts may adopt such rules under their inherent power to regulate attorneys
who practice before them.
15. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1866); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 529, 530-31 (1824); In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966, 967 n.1 (9th Cir. 1949).
16. The following districts have no disciplinary rules: M.D. Ala.; S.D. Ala.; M.D. Ga.;
S.D. Ga.; E.D. Ky.; N.D. Miss.; S.D. Miss.; W.D. N.C.; M.D. Tenn.; E.D. Tex.; N.D.
Tex.; D. Utah; D. Vt.
17. E.g., D. CONN. Civ. R. 2(d)2; D. DEL. R. 25; E.D. ILL. Civ. R. 1(f); S.D.N.Y. GEN.
R. 5(d).
18. E.g., N.D. OHro R. 2(g); W.D. PA. R. 22.
19. E.g., D. CONN. Civ. R. 2(d)l; S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 16E(l); W.D. MIcH. GEN. R. 4(d).
20. See, e.g., D. ME. R. 3(f) (felony conviction or conduct unbecoming an attorney,
violation of Code of Professional Responsibility, willful violation of FED. R. Civ. P. 11);
D. MASS. R. 5(d)(1) (conviction of crime involving moral turpitude, violation of oath of
office); S.D. OHIO R. 2.4.6 (violation of Code of Professional Responsibility or judgment
of mental incompetence); E.D. WASH. GEN. R. l(g) (felony conviction or misdemeanor in-
volving moral turpitude).
21. Some districts require notice to the attorney who is the subject of the disciplinary
proceedings. E.g., N.D. CAL. GEN. R. 8(e)(3). Almost half of the district rules require a
hearing. E.g., N.D. IND. GEN. R. 1(e); D. KAN. R. 4(k); D. MONT. R. l(g); D.R.I. R. 4(e)(1).
But two districts provide for disbarment "without notice or hearing." M.D.N.C. GEN. R.
2(f)(2) (after disbarment by state court or conviction of a felony); N.D. W. VA. GEN. R.
1.05(h) (similar provision). (These two rules may not provide due process of law. See In
re Jones, 506 F.2d 527, 528 (8th Cir. 1974) (local rule providing for "ipso facto" disbarment
following felony conviction did not provide adequate notice). See also note 29 infra.) A
few rules provide for automatic disbarment following suspension or disbarment by
another court, with an opportunity for a subsequent hearing. See, e.g., D. CONN. Civ. R.
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tion of disbarment or suspension of an attorney.22 Only a minority
have rules governing commencement of disciplinary proceedings, 23 and
some judges may be uncertain about how to initiate them.
2 4
II. The Need for Independent Exercise of Federal Disciplinary Power
The dependence of federal discipline is neither required by the
Constitution nor justified by considerations of policy. Like state
courts, federal courts always have had inherent authority to control
their officers. 25 However, the independent disciplinary power of the
federal courts is circumscribed by their reliance on prior state disci-
plinary action.
The power of a federal court in a disciplinary proceeding based on a
prior state proceeding to impose sanctions different from those imposed
by the state court was addressed first in Selling v. Radford.20 After
his state disbarment for professional misconduct, an attorney was
brought before the Supreme Court to show cause why he should not
be expelled from the bar of that Court.2 T The Court held that state
disbarment gives rise to a presumption in federal court that the at-
torney lacks the required moral character to practice law and that he
therefore should be disbarred.28 The presumption created by the state
disbarment could be overcome by any of three conditions: (1) the
state procedures denied the attorney due process of law; (2) the proof
2(d)2. Some districts provide for public bearings by order of the court or at the request
of the attorney. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. GEN. R. 8(e)(3) (order of the court); N.D. ILL. GEN. R.
8(d) (consent of attorney); D. MD. GEN. R. 2A(G) (request of attorney). Two districts
explicitly provide that attorneys may be represented by counsel: S.D. FL,. GEN. R.
16E(7); S.D. Tax. R. l(I). Another procedural safeguard requires written findings of fact.
See, e.g., D. ALAS. GEN. R. 3(G)(6); S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 16E(8); D. HAWAII R. l(h)(6).
22. E.g., C.D. CAL. R. 1.3(e)(4) (notice to United States attorney and state bar); D.N.J.
GEN. R. 7(6) (notice to New Jersey supreme court and Third Circuit); D. M. GE N. R.
2A(G) (notice to Maryland Court of Appeals, state bar association, and National Dis-
cipline Data Bank). The National Discipline Data Bank was established by the ABA in
1968 as a clearinghouse for disciplinary information. The Data Bank primarily serves
state disciplinary bodies. See B. Agata, Report to the Federal Judicial Center on Ad-
missions and Discipline of Attorneys in Federal District Courts 45 (1974) (on file with
Yale Law Journal).
23. Twenty-three of the federal districts have rules that provide for disciplinary
proceedings initiated in federal court. E.g., N.D. CAL. GE,. R. 8(e)(1); D.D.C. R. 4-3;
D.N.J. R. 7(3); E.D. PA. Civ. R. 13. District court rules are collected in FED. LOesL COURT
RULES (Callaghan & Co. 1975).
24. B. Agata, supra note 22, at 42. Some district courts have reported insufficient
funds to prosecute disciplinary charges. Committee on Court Administration, Judicial
Conference of the United States, Report 3 (Sept. 1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
25. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
26. 243 U.S. 46 (1917).
27. Id. at 47-48. The attorney had been disbarred by the state supreme court for
fraud in handling an estate. In re Radford, 168 Mich. 474, 134 N.V. 472 (1912).
28. 243 U.S. at 49-51.
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was patently insufficient; or (3) some other "grave reason" existed why
the federal court should not disbar.20 Yet the Court also stated that
the right to practice before it could not be taken away except by
its own action.
30
In Theard v. United States,31 the Court applied Selling and reversed
a federal court disbarment based solely upon a state disbarment. The
attorney had been disbarred by the state court for a forgery which had
occurred 19 years earlier when he was mentally disabled. After the state
disbarment he was disbarred by the district court under a "show
cause" rule.32 Reversing the federal disbarment, the Supreme Court
found that the attorney's mental condition at the time of forgery and
his satisfactory professional conduct after recovery from that condition
constituted the "grave reason" required by Selling for departure from
the state sanction. 33 The Court emphasized the independence of the
disciplinary power of the federal courts:
While a lawyer is admitted into a federal court by way of a state
court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal court by the
same route. The two judicial systems of courts, the state judica-
tures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the
conduct of their officers .... 34
Selling and Theard suggest that disciplinary proceedings within the
federal and state systems are not linked inextricably; some circum-
stances require, and others permit, federal decisions to reach a dif-
ferent result. At the same time, these cases establish limits upon the
independent power of federal courts to discipline officers in derivative
proceedings. They suggest that, unless one of the Selling conditions is
met, a federal court must impose the same penalty as that imposed
by the prior state disciplinary action. Selling and Theard, however,
did not involve an attempt by a federal court to impose a more
stringent sanction.
29. Id. at 51. That a federal court cannot follow a state disbarment which denies the
attorney due process of law does not mean that the state disbarment necessarily will be
ocrturned. In In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), the Supreme Court reversed a federal
disbarment based on disbarment by the state because the state disbarment provided
inadequate notice. However, the Supreme Court previously had allowed the state dis-
barment order to become final by denying a petition for certiorari. Ruffalo v. Mahoning
County Bar Ass'n, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
30. 243 U.S. at 48.
31. 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
32. Id. at 281-82.
33. Id. at 282.
34. Id. at 281.
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In re A brams,35 recently decided by the Third Circuit, did raise this
question. The case illustrates the disadvantages of derivative policing
and the need for independent enforcement of attorney discipline in
the federal courts. The district court disbarred an attorney36 who had
helped bribe public officials and had been suspended for one year by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey.37 The court of appeals began by
stating that the "absolute and unfettered power of the district court
to discipline lawyers [independently of the disciplinary procedures of
the state courts] may be circumscribed to the extent that the district
court, in imposing its disciplinary sanctions, relies upon a state's factual
or legal determinations." 38 The court of appeals reversed the disbar-
ment because the district court had substituted its own interpretation
of state law for that of the New Jersey court 9 and because the dis-
trict court, without initiating a disciplinary action independent of the
state suspension, had relied on a charge against Abrams not con-
sidered in the state proceedings.
40
The Third Circuit did not reach the question of whether a showing
of "grave reason" would justify departure from the milder state ac-
tion if the district court had relied only on federal law and only on the
35. 521 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038 (1975). Abrams seems to be a
case of first impression. In In re Fleck, 419 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1074 (1970), where the federal court disbarred three attorneys after the state "in-
definitely suspended" them, the sanctions imposed were essentially the same. Moreover,
Fleck avoided discussion of the issues explicitly raised in Abrams. In his Abrams con-
currence, 521 F.2d at 1106, Judge Rosenn distinguished two other cases in which a federal
court departed from a state result: In re Dreier, 258 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1958) (court of ap-
peals reversed district court decision barring admission of attorney suspended and rein-
stated by state court); In re Mackay, 298 F. Supp. 170 (D. Alas. 1969) (district court
which did not follow state suspension had appointed special master who had conducted
three-day hearing).
36. 385 F. Supp. 1210, 1212 (D.N.J. 1974). Apparently, the district court was proceed-
ing under D.N.J. GEN. R. 7(2)(b) and 7(3), which authorize the court to order an at-
torney "[w]ho has been disbarred, suspended from practice or censured in any State,
Territory, District, Commonwealth or Possession" to "show cause . . . why he should
not be disciplined."
37. In re Abrams, 65 N.J. 172, 176, 179, 320 A.2d 471, 474, 475 (1974).
38. 521 F.2d at 1101.
39. The New Jersey supreme court had distinguished In re Colsey, 63 N.J. 210, 306
A.2d 72 (1973), in which an attorney had been disbarred for payments to public officers
similar to those made by Abrams. According to the New Jersey court, the attorney in
Colsey had played an "active part" in the bribery scheme, whereas in Abrams the
lawyer was a "co-victim" as well. 65 N.J. at 176, 320 A.2d at 475. The district court did
not agree that Colsey was distinguishable. Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit
stated: "Having elected to bottom its own rational analysis on New Jersey law, the con-
trolling case for the district court was In re Abrains-not In re Colsey." 521 F.2d at 1103.
40. The county ethics committee originally charged Abrams with bribery and illegal
fee-splitting. 521 F.2d at 1103-04. The state court's decision to suspend him was based
on the bribery charge alone. Yet the district court relied on both charges in deciding to
disbar. 385 F. Supp. at 1211.
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charge considered by the state court. 41 It did make clear, however, that
had the district court initiated disciplinary proceedings independently,
as provided for by its local rules, the lower court could have held the
attorney to a higher standard than the state had without fear of
reversal.
42
Were state disciplinary processes effective, derivative policing might
be acceptable. Unfortunately, it appears that state enforcement of at-
torney discipline is inadequate. 43 There are several possible explana-
tions for this inadequacy. State judges are drawn from the ranks of
the very attorneys upon whom they must impose sanctions.44 In ad-
dition, present disciplinary processes may rely too heavily upon the
profession itself.4 5 Local bar associations, which conduct disciplinary
investigations and initiate disciplinary proceedings, may be less than
41. The majority opinions in the district court and the court of appeals did not
discuss whether the "grave reason" standard could be applied in this manner. However,
Judge Rosenn's concurrence in the court of appeals and the dissent in the district court
took the position that the "grave reason" rule did not justify imposing a harsher penalty
on Abrams. See 521 F.2d at 1107 (Rosenn, J., concurring); 385 F. Supp. at 1213 (Cohen,
Fisher, JJ., dissenting).
Judge Adams would have remanded to the district court to give it an opportunity
either to apply the Selling-Theard test to the state suspension or to initiate an in-
dependent proceeding under D.N.J. GEN. R. 7(2)(d) & 7(4) (described in note 42 infra).
521 F.2d at 1108-09 & n.10 (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting).
42. See 521 F.2d at 1104. In addition to the "show cause" portion of its local rule, see
note 36 supra, the district court is authorized to initiate independent disciplinary pro-
ceedings. D.N.J. GEN. R. 7(2)(d) provides for disciplinary action against any attorney
"[w]ho is guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of this court." D.N.J. GEN.
R. 7(4) outlines the method to be followed for proceedings under Rule 7(2)(d). It is not
clear why the district court did not initiate proceedings under the relevant section of its
local rule-possibly because it did not realize that its sanctioning power would be limited
by the derivatihe posture of its "show cause" proceeding.
43. The need for more effective disciplinary mechanisms has been emphasized by
commentators, who have condemned the gap between "enunciated standards of per-
formance and conduct . . . and the reality of disciplinary enforcement." Marks &
Cathcart, Discipline lWithin the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation? 1974 U. ILL. L.F.
193, 197. In iiew of the size of the bar, disbarments are so infrequent as to indicate a
general failure of the disciplinary process. In 1965, there were 74 federal and state dis-
barments; in 1973 there were 102. ABA Membership Department, Disbarment Chart
1965-1973 (on file with Yale Law Journal). For discussions of the problems of policing
attorney misconduct, see ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 121 ("problem facing the pro-
fession stems from excessive leniency"); N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1975, at 14, col. 3 (Chief
Justice Burger, criticizing apathy of profession in policing itself, stated that profession
has "hardly scratched the surface of the problem" of regulating and disciplining at-
torneys); Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1975, at F-I, col. 6 (few disciplinary proceedings are suc-
cessful); Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Ad Hoc Committee on Grievance
Procedures, Report on the Grievance System 61-66 (Jan. 26, 1976) (criticizing lenient
sanctioning by N.Y. Appellate Division courts).
14. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 55 (1967). For a
criticism of the role of state judges in the disciplinary process, see Marks and Cathcart,
supra note 43, at 202 ("[J]udges do not generally complain to disciplinary bodies about
observed substandard performance.")
45. See Marks & Cathcart, supra note 43, at 202-21 (criticizing role of local bar in
disciplinary process).
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enthusiastic about actively pursuing attorneys engaging in misconduct.
Given the unsatisfactory nature of state disciplinary enforcement, it is
hardly in the best interests of the public to rely upon state enforcement
to determine discipline in the federal courts.
The alternative to derivative federal discipline is a scheme encourag-
ing independently-initiated proceedings by the federal courts. This al-
ternative would enable district courts to hold attorneys to higher stan-
dards of conduct and to impose more stringent sanctions where needed.
To some extent, of course, federal disciplinary enforcement is subject to
the same deficiencies as that of state courts. Federal judges are also
drawn from the ranks of lawyers, and some reliance on the profession
in the disciplinary process is inevitable. Yet federal judges are nomi-
nated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, 40 and protected by
life tenure during good behavior.4 7 They are therefore likely to be
less indebted to local centers of power. As a result, federal courts may
possess greater potential for active discipline than state courts. Even
if federal courts are no more effective in enforcing discipline, the
creation of an independent federal disciplinary system will ensure that
less misconduct goes unpunished. If the state disciplinary process fails
to uncover and sanction professional improprieties, there is a chance
that its federal counterpart will succeed.
It can be argued that independent initiation of federal disciplinary
proceedings would be inefficient because federal courts will duplicate
the efforts of state courts. But since state courts discipline very few
attorneys-presumably far fewer than have engaged in misconduct-the
duplication of effort should be minimal. Moreover, the benefits which
the nonderivative policy affords to the federal courts and the public
would seem to outweigh the costs of inefficiency.
Another possible objection to the suggested reform is the threat it
poses to orderly relations between federal and state courts, a concern
voiced by Judge Rosenn in his Abrams concurrence. 48 A federal court
which imposes a sanction more stringent than that imposed by a state
court implicitly criticizes the judgment of the state court. Judge
Rosenn argued that such federal action interferes with the disciplinary
"province" of the states and undermines public confidence in the state
courts and in the bar.49 However, public confidence in the legal
46. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 44.(1970) (appointment of court of appeals
judges); id. § 133 (Supp. IV 1974) (appointment of district court judges).
47. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
48. 521 F.2d at 1105-06.
49. Id.
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profession seems to have reached a low point;50 effective federal disci-
pline can only increase that confidence. Moreover, in actively policing
attorneys who practice before them, the federal courts are not intruding
on disciplinary functions of the state courts. A greater threat to comity
would arise if federal courts awaited state disciplinary action and then
rejected such action as insufficient. By independently initiating their
own disciplinary proceedings, the federal courts, in fact, avoid sitting
in judgment on state disciplinary proceedings.5'
A final argument against extensive reform of the current federal
system is that there may be a simpler mode of reform: the Supreme
Court could interpret Selling and Theard to allow a federal court to
rely upon prior state disciplinary proceedings, but permit the federal
court to diverge from the sanction imposed by the state. However, since
state disciplinary action is so infrequent and inadequate, an independ-
ent federal disciplinary proceeding would be preferable to retention of
the derivative system. In addition, the district courts would not have
to await lengtlhy state deliberations that permit errant attorneys to
continue practicing before federal courts.5 2
III. Rationales for Federal Rules of Discipline
The adoption of uniform federal disciplinary standards would serve
two specific purposes: (1) the encouragement of independent initiation
of disciplinary proceedings by the district courts and (2) consistent
treatment of attorney misconduct throughout the federal system.
A. Independent Initiation
In the district courts that have no rules providing for independent
initiation of federal disciplinary proceedings,53 federal discipline must
rely almost entirely on state courts. In these districts, federal rules,
50. See, e.g., Blakeney, Should Lawyers Keep Their Monopoly? 46 N.Y.S.BJ. 100, 100
(1974) (citing a public opinion poll in which attorneys ranked 18th out of 20 professions
in terms of public confidence).
51. Judge Rosenn's citation of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to support his
concern with comity seems misplaced. 521 F.2d at 1105 (Rosenn, J., concurring). In
Younger, the Supreme Court refused to enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution,
fearing that an injunction would interfere with the "legitimate activities" of the state.
401 U.S. at 44. Yet elimination of a derivative system of attorney regulation neither
prevents the state court from performing its disciplinary functions nor intrudes on any
of its proceedings.
52. The ABA REPoRT, supra note 3, at 158, is critical of the present situation in which
attorneys are disbarred in state court, yet remain "fully eligible to walk across the street
into the federal courthouse and there command the respect reserved for one entitled to
the status of attorney."
53. See p. 978 supra.
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with explicit provision for independent initiation of disciplinary pro-
ceedings by the district courts, would undoubtedly enable those courts
now without such provisions to police their bars more vigorously.
Promulgation of federal rules also would reform the disciplinary pro-
cesses of those district courts that already have independent initiation
provisions but that still tend to defer to the states in disciplining
attorneys.
The federal rules could explicitly state that independent action by
the district courts is the preferred form of policing those lawyers who
practice before them. Alternatively, the rules could limit the circum-
stances in which a federal court may rely upon prior state proceedings
to cases, for example, where it becomes aware of attorney misconduct
after a final determination has been made by a state court. Even then,
if the court feels that the state sanction is inappropriate, it could make
its own determination of the facts, apply its own disciplinary standards,
and impose its own sanctions. The district court would view the prior
state disposition as providing notice of purported attorney misconduct
and would then institute an independent proceeding.
Promulgation of federal rules of discipline will require simultaneous
development of effective enforcement procedures. That the district
courts up to now have largely failed to devise such procedures militates
against relying on them to find methods to enforce the federal rules.
The rules themselves should designate a method of enforcement."4
54. The rules could place responsibility for federal discipline in the hands of the
United States attorney in each district-a proposal presently before Congress. H.R. 6044,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) (authorizing federal courts to request Attorney General to
investigate charges against attorneys and United States attorney or special prosecutor to
prosecute federal disciplinary proceedings). Presently, very few district courts employ the
investigatory resources of the United States attorneys. Letter from Rowland F. Kirks,
Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Carl Albert, Speaker of
the House of Representatives (Jan. 14, 1975) (on file with Yale Law Journal); Judicial
Conference of the United States, Committee on Court Administration, Report 3 (Sept.
1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Since it is questionable whether the United States
attorneys would devote sufficient time and emphasis to discipline, Congress could require
creation of a small discipline division in each United States attorney's office, thereby
ensuring some active initiation of independent disciplinary procceding.
A second option would be to require each district court to establish an administra-
tive office to handle discipline. Not only would this agency receive complaints from
clients or other victims of attorney misconduct, but it could independently investigate
reports of purported misconduct referred to it by district judges, state courts, and
other sources. The administrator should be an attorney, either appointed on a permanent
basis or enlisted from members of the district bar. Another possibility would be to ap-
point a committee of lawyers admitted to practice before the federal court to in-
vestigate and prosecute violations of professional behavioral norms, as a few districts
already have done. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 1.3(e)(1); D.D.C.R. 4-3 (b), (c). The district
courts would have to supervise the investigations of these district committees to guard
against the passive policing which has characterized state bar grievance and disciplinary
committees. See note 43 supra.
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B. Consistency in Sanctioning
Although there is as yet no formal federal bar,55 a de facto federal
bar already exists in the United States. Many attorneys are federal
court specialists who deal almost exclusively with legal problems not
normally handled in state courts.56 These practitioners are retained to
advise clients in complex federal specialties such as antitrust, bank-
ruptcy, taxation, patent law, and administrative law; they appear in
many different federal courts.5 Given an expanding federal practice,58
it seems reasonable to encourage consistency in the imposition of
sanctions within this de facto federal bar.
That consistency does not exist under present federal disciplinary
rules. The federal district courts often impose different sanctions for
similar infractions. Conduct sanctionable in one district may go un-
punished in another. While some courts have found tax evasion suf-
ficient grounds for disbarment, other courts have refused to hold such
55. A proposal has been made that the Supreme Court formally establish a federal
bar through the exercise of its supervisory power. Wilkey, Proposal for a "United States
Bar", 58 A.B.A.J. 355 (1972). The growing body of substantive federal law and the higher
level of attorney sophistication required to practice before the district courts have raised
questions about the adequacy of state bar examinations to assess the federal practi-
tioner's competence. See, e.g., Kaufman, The Court Needs a Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A.J.
175, 178 (1974); Wilkey, supra note 10, at 1091-92. This concern has prompted suggestions
for a federal bar examination and for minimum admission qualifications to federal
practice. See id. at 1092 (federal bar examination); New Admission Rules Proposed for
Federal District Courts, 61 A.B.A.J. 945 (1975) (description of Second Circuit's proposed
rules for admission to practice before district courts); Kaufman, A Response to Objections
to the Second Circuit's Proposed District Court Admission Rules, 61 A.B.A.J. 1514 (1975).
Discipline, rather than admission, seems a better method of attacking the problem of
incompetent attorneys. As the judges of the Eastern District of New York stated in
deciding not to adopt the rules of admission proposed by the Second Circuit: "'Our own
observation . . . has been that the instances of inadequate representation are almost
always due to personal inadequacies in the lawyer or inadequate preparation of the
case .... " N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1975, at 33, col. 1 (reporting statement issued by the
district judges after vote to reject the proposed admission rules).
It is not necessary to establish a formal federal bar in order to discipline attorneys in
nonderivative federal disciplinary proceedings. Ordinarily, a district court admits to its
bar those admitted to practice in the state in which it sits. See note 10 supra. The
federal courts may retain such derivative admissions procedures. However, while both
admission and disciplinary standards determine who may practice before the federal
(and state) courts, the Supreme Court has recognized that the two are not linked in-
extricably. See p. 978-79 supra. Admission to federal practice may remain derivative
while federal discipline becomes independent.
56. See Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REv.
699 (1975); Note, Retaining Out-of-State Counsel: The Evolution of a Federal Right, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 731 (1967); Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1711 (1967).
57. Wilkey, supra note 10, at 1094.
58. See Chief Justice Burger Issues Yearend Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 189, 189 (1976) (re-
porting 126,000 new cases filed in United States district courts in 1970, 160,602 in 1975,
and predicting 180,000 for 1976).
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conduct sanctionable.59 Some attorneys who have engaged in specious
litigating tactics have been disbarred, while others have not.0 Simi-
larly, while attorneys often are disbarred for fraud, some courts have
been more lenient in their sanctions.61
Some of the disparity in the treatment accorded attorneys reflects
differences in the disciplinary proceedings of the states in which dis-
trict courts Sit. 6 2 Independent enforcement of federal discipline alone,
however, would not solve the problem of inconsistent treatment of
federal attorneys. The differences among existing federal rules preclude
consistency in sanctioning among the districts. 3
The adoption of federal rules of discipline should increase the
likelihood of consistent treatment of attorneys. An analogy may be
made to the Federal Rules of Evidence and of Civil and Criminal
Procedure. Although designed to ensure parallel treatment for litigants
rather than advocates, these procedural rules, like rules of discipline,
seek to achieve uniform treatment within the same judicial system
rather than allow local state practice to control. Adoption of uniform
standards could enhance both the perception of fairness throughout
59. Compare, e.g., In re Bennethum, 205 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Del. 1962) (tax evasion
demonstrated lack of moral fitness to practice law and required disbarment) with In re
Teitelbaum, 253 F.2d 1 (7th. Cir. 1958) (court declined to disbar an attorney for tax
evasion).
60. Compare, e.g., In re MacNeil, 266 F.2d 167, 173, 174 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 861 (1959) (disbarment for frivolous litigation) with Quality Moulding Co. v.
American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 287 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 826
(1961) (disbarment proceedings not initiated against an attorney for deliberately mis-
quoting cases in brief).
61. Compare, e.g., Fletcher v. Laws, 64 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (attorney disbarred
for fraud practiced upon a client) and In re Gladstone, 28 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
(disbarment for conspiring to defraud client) with In re Chandler, 450 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.
1971) (court pointed out attorney fraud merited disbarment, but merely suspended her).
62. For example, some states have disbarred attorneys for misappropriation of client
funds and unnecessary delay; others have imposed only short suspensions for virtually
identical misconduct. Compare, e.g., In re Brown, 104 Ariz. 387, 453 P.2d 958 (1969)
(state disbarment for misappropriation of client's funds and for various counts of neglect
and failure to proceed) and In re Suffolk County Bar Ass'n v. La Freniere, 274 N.Y.S.2d
656, 26 App. Div. 2d 946 (1966), appeal dismissed, 19 N.Y.2d 809, 279 N.Y.S.2d 967, 226
N.E.2d 700 (1967) (state disbarment based on similar facts) with Florida Bar v. Miller,
269 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1972) (three year suspension for conversion of client's funds and
unnecessary delay) and In re Trask, 53 Hawaii 165, 488 P.2d 1167 (1971) (six-month
suspension for unnecessary delay). Similarly, the states have responded rather differently
to like infractions involving willful failure to file federal tax returns. Compare, e.g., In
re Conley, 102 R.I. 756, 229 A.2d 847 (1967) (indefinite suspension) with State v. Cole-
man, 27 Wis. 2d 282, 134 N.W.2d 89 (1965) (reprimand) and In re Anonymous No. 2, 45
App. Div. 2d 89, 357 N.Y.S.2d 506, appeal dismissed, 34 N.Y.2d 961, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1029
(1974) (no sanction).
63. Some rules, for example, require a felony conviction before disbarment or sus-
pension, while others call for sanctions upon misdemeanor convictions. Still others
discipline attorneys for noncriminal violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Procedural differences among the districts may also lead to disparate treatment. See notes
20-21 supra.
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the system and the relevance of precedent developed in other districts.
Consistency within the federal judicial system may increase the
frequency of inconsistent results in state and federal disciplinary pro-
ceedings. But given the questionable disciplinary record of the states
in policing attorney misconduct, 4 the increased inconsistency between
state and federal sanctions may well be in the public interest. More-
over, federal-state consistency is not essential, because attorneys in-
creasingly tend to concentrate their practice in either federal or state
courts. In many cities, some attorneys spend the bulk of their time
practicing before federal courts, whereas the remaining attorneys have
little, if any, contact with these courts. 5 Not only is it likely that state
courts will be far less concerned with misconduct by attorneys who
do not appear before them, but there also are no established pro-
cedures by which federal courts inform the state courts of misconduct
which deserves sanctioning. Professional improprieties which occur in
the expanding field of multidistrict litig-ation 0 may be even less likely
to come to the attention of the appropriate state court for disciplinary
action. If nothing else, it is impractical to expect state courts to
regulate the federal court specialists effectively.
IV. Promulgation of Federal Rules of Discipline
by the Supreme Court
Given the abdication of responsibility for discipline by the district
courts and the need for uniform rules, the Supreme Court should be
the focus of any reform of federal disciplinary processes. Congress has
given the Supreme Court power to promulgate rules of "practice and
procedure" for the lower federal courts. 7 Pursuant to this authority,
the Court has promulgated Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
46(b), which provides for suspension and disbarment of any member
of the bar of a court of appeals who "has been suspended or disbarred
from practice in any other court of record, or has been guilty of
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court."' s To the
64. See note 43 supra.
65. For example, roughly 20% of New York City attorneys practice primarily before
the federal courts. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICs-A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR
15-16 (1966). Carlin states that "[l]awyers with an elite practice . . . are most likely to be
in contact with federal courts .... " Id. at 27.
66. For a brief discussion of the problems concerning the growing federal multidis-
trict practice, see Note, Attorneys: Intcrstate and Federal Practice, supra note 56, at
1724-26.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) (rules in civil actions); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772 (1970)
(rules in criminal actions).
68. See also FED. R. APP. P. 46(c) (authorizing a court of appeals to "take any appro-
priate disciplinary action against any attorney who practices before it for conduct un-
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extent that Rule 46(b) attempts to regulate attorney conduct outside
the courtroom, it would seem to reach beyond "practice and proce-
dure," which entails such matters as "the form of process, writs, plead-
ings, and motions." 69 Conceivably, the Court could promulgate federal
rules of discipline under its general supervisory power over the lower
federal courts. However, the Court has traditionally exercised its su-
pervisory power in the same general area of "practice and procedure"
that is covered by the congressional delegation of rulemaking au-
thority.7
0
An additional grant of rulemaking authority thus may be required
if the Court-is to draft the desired federal rules of discipline.71 The
enabling legislation for the rules of discipline, however, should not be
accompanied by the requirement, found in the existing enabling
statutes, that the Supreme Court report its disciplinary rules to Con-
gress. 7 2 Because discipline is essentially a form of judicial houseclean-
ing, Congress should not assume responsibility for enactment of uni-
becoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with . . . any rule of the
court"); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (authorizing "appropriate disciplinary action" against an
attorney who willfully violates requirement that to the best of the attorney's knowledge
there is good ground to support a pleading).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). There is no indication in the legislative history of the
enabling legislation that attorney discipline was part of "practice and procedure." See S.
REP. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947);
S. REP. No. 1049, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
70. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942). For a general discussion
of the scope of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers, see Note, The Supervisory
Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656, 1656-59 (1963).
71. If Congress fails to delegate the requisite rulemaking authority to the Supreme
Court, or if the Supreme Court decides against promulgation of formal rules of disci-
pline, the Judicial Conference of the United States could assist in implementing the
reforms proposed in this Note. While the Conference has no authority to promulgate
formal rules of discipline, its duties include advising on the improvement of the ad-
ministration of justice in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). In the past, the
Conference and its committees have drafted rules, leaving it to the district courts to
decide whether to adopt them. See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the United States, Com-
mittee on the Operation of the Jury System, Report on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue,
45 F.R.D. 391, 404-13 (1968), which recommends rules aimed at protecting criminal de-
fendants from prejudicial publicity while preserving the right of the press to report on
trials. The "Free Press-Fair Trial" rules have been subsequently adopted as formal rules
by a number of district courts. See, e.g., S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 21; D.N.J. GEN. R. 36; E.D.
ILL. CRIm. R. 28A (adopting rules in part). Moreover, other courts, while not formally
adopting the recommendations, have relied on them in their opinions. See, e.g., United
States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 105-06 (5th Cir. 1974); Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689, 692 nA (N.D. I11. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3756 (U.S. 1976).
72. The enabling legislation for the rules of civil and criminal procedure provides
that the rules shall not take effect until 90 days after they have been reported to Con-
gress. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). Congress may extend this period
to consider the rules more fully or to amend them. See Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-361, 88 Stat. 397 (postponing effective date of amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (Supp. IV 1974) (providing that Federal
Rules of Evidence would become effective only upon affirmative approval by Congress).
Disbarment in the Federal Courts
form standards. Legislative interference with internal court affairs is
unwarranted, given the judiciary's inherent power and competence to
handle professional improprieties and misconduct. 73 Moreover, the
legislative process may impede speedy promulgation of federal rules of
discipline. 74 The enabling legislation therefore should provide that
the federal rules of attorney discipline will take effect upon promulga-
tion by the Court.7 5 Congress should limit its further involvement to
appropriation of funds to ensure adequate enforcement of the rules. 76
73. See Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[I]t would be
peculiar, if not unreasonable . . . to place responsibility for disciplining attorneys . . .
elsewhere than in the courts. No other body is as well qualified or as interested in
determining whether an attorney is qualified to practice law."); ABA REPORT, supra
note 3, at 18 (urging that courts assume responsibility for disciplinary reform); ABA
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, Recommendations 2 (Feb. 1974) (on file
with Yale Law Journal) (reporting ABA House of Delegates resolution that the ju-
diciary, not the legislative branch, should be responsible for attorney discipline). For an
argument that congressional changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence were an unwise
departure from a long tradition of deference to Supreme Court rulemaking, see Moore
& Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9, 11-12, 36-38 (1974).
74. For example, after years of work by the Judicial Conference, the Federal Rules
of Evidence were promulgated by the Supreme Court. Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). They were not adopted by Congress
until two years later. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. Similarly,
congressional involvement delayed the final adoption of amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397 (postponing
effective date to Aug. 1, 1975).
75. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1970) (giving Supreme Court power to prescribe rules of
criminal procedure for proceedings after verdict and to fix dates when such rules shall
take effect).
Even if promulgation of disciplinary rules were properly within the existing enabling
legislation, the rules should be allowed to take effect automatically after being reported
to Congress. See note 72 supra.
76. See ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, Recommendations I
(Feb. 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (recommending federal legislation to provide
funding and personnel to enforce professional discipline in the federal courts).
